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THINGS  WE  DO  WITH  PRESUMPTIONS:
REFLECTIONS  ON KIOBEL  V.  ROYAL
DUTCH PETROLEUM
Carlos M. Vázquez *
INTRODUCTION
The Court in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. relied on the presump-
tion against extraterritoriality in declining to recognize a federal cause of
action for the defendants’ alleged breaches of customary international law.1
The bulk of Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion for the Court defended the appli-
cability of the presumption to the claims brought under the Alien Tort Stat-
ute (ATS).2  As Justice Alito’s concurring opinion noted, however, the Chief
Justice’s opinion adopted a “narrow approach” that “[left] much unan-
swered.”3  Similarly, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence observed that the Chief
Justice’s opinion properly “[left] open a number of significant questions.”4
In determining what exactly the Court decided in Kiobel and what it left
undecided, it is useful to distinguish several things that might be done with a
presumption such as that against extraterritoriality.
Most straightforwardly, the courts apply the presumption in interpreting
federal statutes.  Specifically, they use the presumption in determining the
applicability of the statute to claims based partially or wholly on conduct that
occurred outside United States territory.  On the assumption that Congress
legislates with domestic conditions in mind, a court applying the presump-
tion interprets a statute not to apply “extraterritorially” unless Congress has
expressed a contrary intent.
 2014 Carlos M. Vázquez.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and
distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for educational purposes, so
long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review,
and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.  I am grateful for comments
from Marty Lederman and Ingrid Wuerth.
1 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013).
2 Id. at 1664–69.
3 Id. at 1669–70 (Alito, J., concurring).
4 Id. at 1669 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also id. at 1673 (Breyer, J., concurring)
(“[Roberts’s opinion] leaves for another day the determination of just when the presump-
tion against extraterritoriality might be ‘overcome.’” (quoting id. at 1666 (majority
opinion))).
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A threshold question when a court is asked to apply the presumption
against extraterritoriality is whether the presumption is applicable to the type
of statute in question.  With respect to certain types of statutes, application of
the presumption against extraterritoriality would not advance the purposes
of the presumption.  I argue in Part I that the presumption should be
regarded as categorically inapplicable to statutes conferring jurisdiction on
the federal courts.  I argue further that the majority opinion in Kiobel sup-
ports the conclusion that the presumption is inapplicable to such statutes.  It
is clear from the Court’s opinion that it was not applying the presumption to
determine the geographical scope of the ATS qua jurisdictional statute.  It
was instead applying the presumption to determine the geographical scope
of the federal common law cause of action it had recognized in Sosa v. Alva-
rez-Machain.
Even when the presumption against extraterritoriality is applicable,
courts will not always conclude that the statute does not apply extraterritori-
ally.  Although the courts presume that Congress meant for the statute to
apply only domestically, that presumption can be rebutted or overcome.  The
usual way in which the presumption can be rebutted or overcome is through
sufficient evidence that Congress meant for the statute to apply extraterritori-
ally.  In some cases, the Court has focused exclusively on the statute’s text,
suggesting that the presumption against extraterritoriality is a clear statement
rule that can be overcome only by clear statutory language.5  But, in Morrison
v. National Australia Bank Ltd., the Court recognized that “context” can be
taken into account as well.6  And, in Kiobel, the Court recognized that a stat-
ute’s “historical background” might also “overcome” the presumption.7
These methods of rebutting or overcoming the presumption are discussed in
Part II.
When a court finds the presumption applicable and not rebutted or
overcome, it must determine whether the statute applies to the particular
case before it.  As the Court recognized in Morrison, a non-extraterritorial
statute might reach a case based on conduct that is partly foreign and partly
domestic.8  Applying the presumption in such a case, the Court explained,
requires identification of “the ‘focus’ of congressional concern” under the
relevant statute.9  If the statute is non-extraterritorial, the conduct that was
5 See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 258 (1991).
6 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2883 (2010).
7 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1666 (majority opinion).
8 Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2884.
9 Id.  These three things that one might do with a presumption might usefully be
placed on a spectrum.  The first asks whether a broad category of statutes should be
regarded as beyond the scope of the presumption (because the assumptions underlying
the presumption do not apply or because the presumption’s purposes would not be
advanced).  The second asks whether the presumption is inapplicable to a particular stat-
ute (because there is sufficient evidence that Congress wanted the statute to apply extrater-
ritorially).  The third inquiry operates at a case-specific level (asking whether the statute as
construed in light of the presumption applies to the particular conduct in question).  The
lines between these three categories are not always clear, and the Court in Morrison and
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the focus of congressional concern must have occurred in the United States.
When a court determines the statute’s applicability to the facts of a particular
case, it might be said to be determining whether the presumption has been
satisfied in the particular case.  How to satisfy the presumption is discussed in
Part III.
The Court in Kiobel may have recognized a fourth thing that might be
done with the presumption against extraterritoriality: the presumption might
in certain circumstances be displaced.  The majority used this term in the final
paragraph of its opinion, a paragraph that has generated much debate about
what sorts of questions the Court left open in Kiobel.  The Court wrote that
“even where the claims touch and concern the territory of the United States,
they must do so with sufficient force to displace the presumption against
extraterritorial application.”10  The Court may have been using the term to
refer to the issue I have refer to as the “satisfying” of the presumption.  There
is also some basis, however, for understanding the Court to have left open
the possibility that the presumption might be inapplicable or rebutted with
respect to some claims brought under the ATS for violations of customary
international law.  What the Court meant by “displacing” the presumption is
the subject of Part IV.
I. DETERMINING WHETHER THE PRESUMPTION IS APPLICABLE
The presumption against extraterritoriality is a technique for interpret-
ing statutes.  It reflects the Court’s assumption that Congress, when it legis-
lates, is concerned with domestic conditions and does not mean to “‘rule the
world.’”11  The presumption also seeks to “protect against unintended
clashes between our laws and those of other nations which could result in
international discord.”12  Because Congress “ ‘alone has the facilities neces-
sary to make fairly such an important policy decision,’” the courts will inter-
pret the statute not to apply extraterritorially in the absence of “ ‘the
affirmative intention of the Congress clearly expressed.’”13
A threshold question concerning the presumption against extraterritori-
ality will frequently be whether the statute in question is one to which the
presumption should apply.  Certain categories of statutes do not implicate
the concerns that underlie the presumption.  For example, the assumption
that Congress legislates with only domestic conditions in mind is not valid for
Kiobel blurred them.  For example, it blurred the line between the second and the third
categories by recognizing that the presumption can be overcome with respect to specific
applications of a statute (as opposed to the statute as a whole). See infra text accompanying
notes 68–69, 72; see also infra notes 77, 123 (noting Court’s blurring of the line between the
first and second categories).  Nevertheless, the distinctions drawn in this Article retain ana-
lytical value.
10 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669.
11 Id. at 1664 (majority opinion) (quoting Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S.
437, 454 (2007)).
12 Id. (quoting EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991)).
13 Id. (quoting Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248).
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certain types of statutes.  Consider a statute enacted  to implement a treaty.
Because treaties, by their nature, address matters of international concern, it
is difficult to say that a statute implementing a treaty was enacted with only
domestic situations in mind.  To be sure, it is possible that a given treaty
imposes obligations on parties only with respect to conduct occurring within
their borders.  For example, the United States has taken the position that the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights does not impose extra-
territorial obligations.14  Its interpretation conflicts with that of other nations
and some international bodies, and the State Department’s Legal Adviser
recently urged reconsideration of this position.15  Whether the United
States’ position is correct or not, it is clear that the question is a matter of
treaty interpretation, to be decided in accordance with international law
principles of treaty interpretation.16  The presumption against extraterritori-
ality has no relevance in determining the extraterritorial scope of treaties.
The presumption therefore should have no bearing on the extraterritorial
scope of a statute implementing a treaty.
Another type of statute that does not implicate the concerns that under-
lie the presumption against extraterritoriality is one that limits the authority
of executive officials.  As noted, the purpose of the presumption against
extraterritoriality is to guard against unintended clashes with the laws of
other nations and, more generally, to avoid international friction.  If a statute
limiting the authority of executive officials were interpreted to apply only to
conduct within U.S. territory, however, the result would be an expansion of
the authority of the relevant officials to act overseas.  Interpreting such a stat-
ute not to apply extraterritorially thus increases the power of such officials to
cause international friction.  Applying the presumption against extraterritori-
ality to this type of statute would not advance the goal of avoiding clashes
with other nations.  There may be other reasons to interpret such a statute
narrowly, but the avowed purpose of the presumption against extraterritorial-
ity—avoiding international friction—is not one of them.
For both of the foregoing reasons, the presumption against extraterrito-
riality should have been deemed inapplicable to the statute in question in
14 U.N. CCPR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 53d Sess., 1405th mtg. ¶ 20, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/
SR.1405 (Apr. 24, 1995) (statement of State Department Legal Adviser Conrad Harper).
15 See Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, Memorandum Opinion
on the Geographic Scope of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 2–5
(Oct. 19, 2010), available at http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/03/07/world/
state-department-iccpr.html?action=click&contentCollection=World&module=RelatedCov
erage&region=Marginalia&pgtype=article (describing criticisms of the United States posi-
tion and recommending change in position).  A similar debate surrounds the extraterrito-
rial applicability of the Convention Against Torture. See Harold Hongju Koh, Legal
Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, Memorandum Opinion on the Geographic Scope of the Con-
vention Against Torture and Its Application in Situations of Armed Conflict (Jan. 21,
2013), available at https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/1053901-state-depart
ment-cat-memo.html.
16 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties arts. 31–33, opened for signature May
23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980).
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Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc.,17 which involved the extraterritorial appli-
cability of a statute forbidding the return of refugees to countries where they
would be persecuted on various specified grounds.  The Court applied the
presumption against extraterritoriality and concluded that the statute pro-
hibited officials from returning refugees to their persecutors if they reached
our shores but did not prohibit officials from interdicting such refugees on
the high seas and returning them to their persecutors.18  In apparent recog-
nition of the argument made above that applying the presumption against
extraterritoriality to this statute would not help avoid international friction,
the Court in Morrison cited Sale for the proposition that the presumption
“applies regardless of whether there is a risk of conflict between the Ameri-
can statute and a foreign law.”19  Presumably it applies in such a context
because of the assumption that Congress legislates with domestic conditions
in mind.  The validity of the latter assumption with respect to the statute
involved in Sale is questionable, however, as the statute was enacted to imple-
ment a treaty—the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees.20
The concerns underlying the presumption against extraterritoriality are
also categorically inapplicable to the type of statute involved in Kiobel: statutes
conferring jurisdiction on the federal courts.  Neither of the explanations for
the presumption against extraterritoriality supports its application to this sort
of statute.  The first explanation is that, when Congress enacts a statute, it
intends to regulate only domestic conduct.  In the words of the Court in
Kiobel, Congress does not intend to “rule the world.”  A statute conferring
federal jurisdiction does not regulate conduct at all—it merely allocates juris-
diction as between federal and state courts.  The second explanation is that
applying the presumption avoids international friction by avoiding unin-
tended clashes with the laws of other nations.  Interpreting a jurisdictional
statute not to apply extraterritorially would actually frustrate this purpose.  If a
statute conferring federal jurisdiction were interpreted to apply only to
purely domestic cases, the result would be that extraterritorial cases would
have to be brought in state courts.  There is no reason to think that state
courts would be more likely than the federal courts to rule in a way that
avoids international friction.  Indeed, the Founders clearly believed the con-
trary—they authorized federal jurisdiction in cases touching upon foreign
relations because they believed the federal courts were more likely to be sen-
sitive to foreign relations concerns, and thus were more likely to avoid inter-
17 509 U.S. 155 (1993); see Nicholas R. Koberstein, Comment, Without Justification: Reli-
ance on the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality in Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 7
GEO. IMMIG. L.J. 569 (1993) (elaborating critique of Sale on these grounds).
18 Id. at 177–88.
19 Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877–78 (2010).
20 Sale, 509 U.S. at 159 (citing United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refu-
gees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577).
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national friction, than the state courts.21  Since the framers of the Alien Tort
Statute were also Founders, it is reasonable to attribute to them the same
preference of having cases implicating foreign relations be heard in the fed-
eral rather than the state courts.
There may, of course, be foreign-relations-related reasons for dismissing
some suits from both federal and state courts.  For example, a suit against a
foreign sovereign may have to be dismissed on grounds of foreign sovereign
immunity.22  Additionally, a suit that requires the court to hold invalid the
act of a foreign state within its own territory may have to be dismissed on the
basis of the act of state doctrine.23  But a dismissal on these grounds differs
profoundly from a dismissal for lack of federal jurisdiction.  Dismissal of a
suit against a foreign state for lack of federal jurisdiction leaves it open to the
plaintiff to pursue the case in state court.  To be sure, the state court would
also be required to dismiss the suit on foreign sovereign immunity or act-of-
state grounds.24  But a lack of federal jurisdiction would mean that this ques-
tion would be decided by a state court rather than a federal court.  If the state
courts are more likely to decide that issue erroneously, as the Founders
appear to have believed, construing the jurisdictional statute not to apply
extraterritorially would increase the likelihood of international friction.
In sum, it seems clear that applying the presumption against extraterrito-
riality to statutes conferring federal jurisdiction would run afoul of the princi-
pal purpose of the presumption.  Because cases with extraterritorial elements
are, as a class, more likely to raise foreign relations concerns than purely
domestic cases, the considerations that underlie the presumption against
extraterritoriality cut in favor of interpreting jurisdictional statutes to apply
extraterritorially.  If so, the presumption should have been deemed inappli-
cable to the ATS.
While the Court in Sale overlooked the reasons for finding the presump-
tion inapplicable to the statute before it, the Court in Kiobel appears to have
recognized that the presumption is inapplicable to jurisdictional statutes.
Although the majority opinion did not say so in so many words, its analysis
shows that the Court did not hold that the ATS, qua jurisdictional statute,
does not apply to extraterritorial cases.25  A careful reading of the opinion
supports the conclusion that the Court in Kiobel held instead that the pre-
21 See Carlos M. Vázquez, Alien Tort Claims and the Status of Customary International Law,
106 AM J. INT’L L. 531, 539–40 (2012).
22 See 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (2006).
23 See W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., Int’l, 493 U.S. 400, 406–09
(1990) (“Act of state issues only arise when a court must decide—that is, when the outcome
of the case turns upon—the effect of official action by a foreign sovereign. . . . The act of
state doctrine . . . requires that, in the process of deciding [a case], the acts of foreign
sovereigns taken within their own jurisdictions shall be deemed valid.”).
24 See 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (“Subject to existing international agreements to which the
United States is a party at the time of enactment of this Act a foreign state shall be immune
from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of the States except as provided
in sections 1605 to 1607 of this chapter.”).
25 See infra notes 28–32 and accompanying text.
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sumption against extraterritoriality applies to the federal common law causes
of action that it had recognized in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.
In Sosa, the Court made it clear that the ATS is “purely jurisdictional.”26
The statute confers jurisdiction on the federal courts over certain claims
based on customary international law (and treaties).  It does not itself create
a cause of action.  The Court in Sosa concluded that, at the time of the enact-
ment of the ATS, a cause of action for certain “torts in violation of the law of
nations” was thought to exist as a matter of general common law—the “ambi-
ent law of the era.”27  Since, post-Erie, we no longer believe in the general
common law, the Court in Sosa concluded that the cause of action for viola-
tion of the norms that were deemed actionable in 1789 should continue to
be recognized today as federal common law causes of action, and that the
courts may recognize new causes of action for analogous norms of present-
day customary international law, also as a matter of federal common law.
Recognizing a federal common law cause of action was, in the Court’s view,
an appropriate modern translation of the pre-Erie assumptions that underlay
the ATS’s conferral of federal jurisdiction over such claims.
The Court’s analysis in Kiobel supports the conclusion that the Court was
holding that the presumption against extraterritoriality applies to the judi-
cially created federal common law remedy recognized in Sosa, not to the ATS
qua jurisdictional statute.  The Court in Kiobel reiterated that the ATS was
“‘strictly jurisdictional’” and, as such,  “does not directly regulate conduct or
afford relief.”28  In addition, the Court recognized that “the question” before
it in Kiobel was “not what Congress has done but instead what courts may
do.”29  If the Court had held that the ATS, as a jurisdictional statute, did not
apply to extraterritorial cases, the question before it would, indeed, have
been the determination of the geographical scope of “what Congress [had]
done.”30  In the Court’s view, the fact that the issue was “what courts may do”
strengthened the case for applying the presumption against extraterritorial-
ity.31  The Court reiterated the Sosa Court’s statements about the need for
caution in recognizing causes of action in this area because of the possible
foreign relations consequences and it expressed the view that these concerns
“are all the more pressing when the question is whether a cause of action . . .
reaches conduct within the territory of another sovereign.”32
Recognizing that the Court in Kiobel was applying the presumption to
determine the geographical scope of the federal common law cause of action
recognized in Sosa helps explain an otherwise mystifying aspect of the
Court’s decision to apply the presumption against extraterritoriality in the
26 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 743 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring).
27 Id. at 714 (majority opinion).
28 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1664 (2013) (quoting Sosa,




32 Id. at 1664–65.
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case.  The ATS applies to torts “in violation of the law of nations.”33  Thus,
the statute confers jurisdiction over actions based on violations of legal
norms that apply universally.  If the concern underlying the presumption
against extraterritoriality is the impropriety of the United States purporting
to “rule the world,” the concern seems inapplicable to a statute that applies
only to conduct that is prohibited by universally applicable international law.
Some commentators have argued, on this ground, that the ATS does not
even constitute an example of the United States exercising jurisdiction to
prescribe law.34  In an action under the ATS, these commentators have
argued, the U.S. courts are not prescribing rules; they are merely applying
rules of international law that independently govern the conduct in question.
The Court did not provide a clear answer to this argument either in Sosa
or in Kiobel.  In prior work, I have explained why recognition of a private
cause of action for violation of the sorts of customary international law norms
involved in cases like Kiobel does constitute an exercise by the United States
of jurisdiction to prescribe.  While it is true that in all cases brought under
the ATS, the defendant’s conduct will be prohibited by independently appli-
cable norms, the plaintiff’s remedy is not conferred by such law.35  Even
though international law imposed the substantive obligation that was violated
by the defendant in such well-known ATS cases as Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,36
international law did not entitle the plaintiff to monetary relief from the indi-
vidual defendant.  International law generally provides for the responsibility
of the defendant’s state for the violation and sometimes provides for the per-
sonal criminal liability of the defendant, but it does not provide for personal
civil liability of the defendant to the injured individual.  For the defendant to
be personally liable in damages, international law must be supplemented by
domestic law.  In cases brought under the ATS, the domestic law that pro-
vides for the personal damage liability of the defendant is the federal com-
mon law that establishes the cause of action, as recognized in Sosa.37
If federal law is supplementing international law by establishing a private
damage remedy, the United States is exercising its jurisdiction to prescribe
law.  It might be argued that the fact that the United States is not actually
imposing any new obligations on the defendant should nevertheless have led
the Court in Kiobel to apply the presumption against extraterritoriality with
less force.  After all, the concern about the United States purporting to “rule
the world” is implicated to a lesser extent where the United States is merely
33 Id. at 1665.
34 See, e.g., Anthony J. Colangelo, The Alien Tort Statute and the Law of Nations in Kiobel
and Beyond, 44 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1329, 1331–32 (2013); William S. Dodge, Alien Tort Litigation
and the Prescriptive Jurisdiction Fallacy, 51 HARV. INT’L L.J. ONLINE 35, 37 (2010); William S.
Dodge, Alien Tort Litigation: The Road Not Taken, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1603 (2014).
35 Carlos M. Vázquez, Customary International Law as U.S. Law: A Critique of the Revision-
ist and Intermediate Positions and a Defense of the Modern Position, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1495,
1504, 1547 (2011).
36 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
37 See Vázquez, supra note 35, at 1504 & n.40.
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attaching a remedy to an internationally prescribed norm.38  Cutting against
this position, however, is the notion that the secondary rules of international
law (those prescribing remedies for violation of primary rules) are carefully
calibrated.  A nation that unilaterally adds a remedy to those available under
international law upsets the careful balance.  Thus, when the United States
defended a contemplated use of force in Syria on the ground that the Syrian
regime had violated international law by using chemical weapons on its own
people,39 other nations responded that a nation’s violation of international
law—even one as important as the prohibition of the use of chemical weap-
ons—does not entitle another state to use force against it in the absence of
Security Council authorization (except in limited circumstances, such as in
self-defense).40  Although it is true that a nation’s creation of a remedy for a
violation of international law is a lesser exercise of jurisdiction to prescribe
than the imposition of a substantive obligation, it is nevertheless an exercise
of prescriptive jurisdiction that might legitimately trigger foreign objections.
That the defendant’s conduct was not prescribed unilaterally by the United
States does not mean that recognition of a federal common law damage rem-
edy is not an exercise of jurisdiction to prescribe.
That the Court found the presumption against extraterritoriality to be
applicable in determining the geographical scope of the federal common law
cause of action recognized in Sosa, rather than the “strictly jurisdictional”
statute that Congress enacted, raises some interesting questions about the
jurisdictional statute’s applicability to nonfederal causes of action where the
plaintiff seeks relief for injuries caused by violations of customary interna-
tional law taking place abroad.  In discussing this issue, it is useful to distin-
guish three possible types of claims.
First, assume that a state (say, California) recognizes a private cause of
action for violations of customary international law occurring abroad and an
alien seeks damages for such a violation.  Would there be federal jurisdiction
under the ATS, given that it is a suit by an alien for a tort in violation of
customary international law?  The reasons that led Congress to confer juris-
diction on the federal courts for such claims, where the cause of action was
based on the general law, would seem equally applicable where the cause of
action is based on state law.  There might be an issue whether Article III
permits a grant of jurisdiction over such a case.  There is no substantial Arti-
38 See Vázquez, supra note 21, at 542.
39 Oona A. Hathaway & Scott J. Shapiro, On Syria, a U.N. Vote Isn’t Optional, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 4, 2013, at A23; Press Release, The White House, Statement by the President on Syria
(Aug. 31, 2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/08/31/statement-pre
sident-syria.
40 See Jillian Blake & Aqsa Mahmud, A Legal ‘Red Line’?: Syria and the Use of Chemical
Weapons in Civil Conflict, 61 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 244, 257 (2013); David Davenport,
International Law? U.S. Military Action in Syria Is Actually Prohibited by the U.N. Charter, FORBES
(Sept. 11, 2013, 8:44 A.M.), http://www.forbes.com/sites/daviddavenport/2013/09/11/in
ternational-law-u-s-military-action-is-actually-prohibited-by-the-un-charter/; Curtis Doeb-
bler, The Use of Force Against the People of Syria Will Be a Serious Violation of International Law,
JURIST (Sept. 8, 2013), http://jurist.org/forum/2013/09/curtis-doebbler-force-syria.php.
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cle III question where federal common law creates the cause of action.41
There would be no Article III problem even if the cause of action was based
on state law if the underlying substantive law (in this case, customary interna-
tional law) were deemed to have the status of federal law for Article III pur-
poses.  That customary international law does have such status is the “modern
position,”42 but this position has been questioned by some scholars.43  Even
if customary international law were not considered federal law for Article III
purposes, Article III jurisdiction could be based on one or more theories of
protective jurisdiction.44  These questions are beyond the scope of this
Article.
In an earlier article, I suggested that state causes of action based on vio-
lations of customary international law for which there is no federal cause of
action for the reasons given in Sosa are very likely preempted.45
In limiting the federal right of action to [a] subset of customary interna-
tional law norms, the Court in Sosa expressed concern about the foreign
relations sensitivities of extending the right of action to less-well-established
norms and the potential interference with the “discretion of the Legislative
and Executive Branches in managing foreign affairs” that could result.
These same structural concerns would result from the recognition and
enforcement of State law rights of action.46
This would be true at least when the violation was committed by a foreign or
federal official.47 Kiobel relied on similar concerns in holding that the fed-
eral cause of action does not apply extraterritorially, so perhaps the Court
would conclude that state causes of action for violations of customary interna-
tional law occurring abroad are preempted as well.  The presumption against
extraterritoriality has until now been regarded as applicable to federal stat-
utes, not state law.  But perhaps the Court will extend the “presumption” to
state laws based on its purpose of avoiding foreign relations problems.  If so,
41 See Vázquez, supra note 21, at 532.
42 See Vázquez, supra note 35, at 1515.
43 See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal
Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815 (1997) (questioning
the “modern position” which is reflected in the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 111 (1987)); Michael D. Ramsey, International Law
as Non-preemptive Federal Law, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 555, 577, 584–85 (2002) (positing that cus-
tomary international law should be regarded as a form of non-preemptive federal law);
Ernest A. Young, Sorting Out the Debate over Customary International Law, 42 VA. J. INT’L L.
365, 370 (2002) (arguing that customary international law should continue to be under-
stood as general law).  These perspectives and others are discussed in Vázquez, supra note
35.
44 On protective jurisdiction, see RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S
THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 764–72 (6th ed. 2009). See generally Carlos
M. Vázquez, The Federal “Claim” in the District Courts: Osborn, Verlinden, and Protective Juris-
diction, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1731, 1733 (2007) (defending some theories of protective
jurisdiction).
45 See Vázquez, supra note 35, at 1626–27.
46 Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 727 (2004)).
47 Id. at 1627.
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the presumption would presumably not be rebuttable by clear legislative
intent to reach extraterritorial conduct, as state legislatures have no greater
claim to a power to cause foreign relations problems than do state (or fed-
eral) courts.  As applied to state legislation (or common law), therefore, the
presumption would not function as a presumption but rather as a flat limit
on state legislative power, akin to the limit recognized in Zschernig v. Miller
now known as the dormant foreign relations doctrine.48  If the Court does
not recognize this federal limit on the scope of state legislative power, and if
Article III concerns were overcome, then the ATS should be construed to
confer federal jurisdiction over state causes of action for extraterritorial viola-
tions of customary international law.
A harder question would be posed by a state tort claim based on extra-
territorial conduct where the alleged conduct would make out a violation of
customary international law.  Should the ATS be construed to cover such a
case, even if the state cause of action does not require a showing that the
conduct violates customary international law?  Ordinary tort claims based on
conduct abroad are frequently brought in the state and federal courts.49  In
the absence of diversity, the threshold Article III problem would be more
difficult to overcome in this context, although conceivably Article III jurisdic-
tion could be based on a protective jurisdiction theory.  The fact that the suit
concerns an alien might justify federal concern, but concern about bias to
foreigners is typically the basis for conferral of diversity jurisdiction, and Arti-
cle III diversity jurisdiction does not permit federal jurisdiction on the basis
of party alignment when the suit is between aliens.  In any event, the fact that
such a case does not require the court “to hold that a foreign government or
its agent has transgressed [the] limits”50 of international law weakens the
case for federal jurisdiction.  For the same reason, the case for regarding the
state cause of action as preempted is weaker as well.
What about a suit raising a foreign cause of action for a violation of cus-
tomary international law?51  Could such a suit be brought in federal court
under the ATS, or would it have to be brought in state court?  Clearly, there
is no obstacle to a state (or a federal court with jurisdiction, for example if
the parties are diverse) entertaining an action based on the law of the place
where the conduct took place.  Indeed, applying foreign law is usually
regarded as a means of deferring to foreign interests and avoiding interna-
48 See Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 432 (1968) (holding that an Oregon statute
defining the property rights of foreigners was an unacceptable “intrusion by the State into
the field of foreign affairs”). See generally Carlos Manuel Vázquez, W(h)ither Zschernig?, 46
VILL. L. REV. 1259 (2001) (defending a version of the dormant foreign affairs doctrine).
49 See, e.g., Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804 (1986).
50 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 727.
51 The idea of such a suit is not far-fetched.  In McKesson Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran,
672 F.3d 1066, 1075 (D.C. Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1582 (2013), the D.C. Circuit
held that Iranian law conferred a cause of action for violation of a treaty between the
United States and Iran, even though the court had earlier concluded that the treaty did
not confer privately enforceable rights as a matter of U.S. law.  539 F.3d 485, 491 (D.C. Cir.
2008).
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tional friction.  But, if the foreign cause of action incorporates international
law, the suit would require the court to declare the defendant, possibly a
foreign official, to have breached international law.  Such a judicial declara-
tion is no less likely to cause a foreign relations problem because the cause of
action was created by foreign law.  Perhaps the act of state doctrine would
require dismissal of some such cases.52  If not, there is a substantial reason
for wanting these cases in federal rather than state courts.  (Again, Article III
concerns would have to be overcome, either on the theory that customary
international law is federal law even when it is incorporated into a foreign
cause of action or on a theory of protective jurisdiction.)
In sum, the presumption against extraterritoriality would appear to be
categorically inapplicable to some types of statutes, either because the back-
ground assumption underlying the presumption against extraterritoriality—
that Congress generally legislates with domestic conditions in mind—is
unlikely to be true, or because application of the presumption would frus-
trate, rather than advance, the presumption’s purpose of avoiding interna-
tional friction.  For both reasons, the presumption should be regarded as
inapplicable to statutes conferring jurisdiction on the federal courts.  The
Court in Kiobel appears to have recognized the inapplicability of the pre-
sumption against extraterritoriality to jurisdictional statutes.  The Court did
not hold that the ATS’s jurisdictional grant did not extend to cases based on
foreign conduct.  The Court instead applied the presumption to determine
the geographical scope of the federal common law cause of action it had
recognized in Sosa, holding that a federal cause of action exists only for
claims having sufficient contacts with the United States.  If so, then the ATS
may continue to confer jurisdiction over some cases by aliens for violations of
customary international law occurring abroad.
II. REBUTTING (OR OVERCOMING) THE PRESUMPTION
Even if the presumption is applicable, it does not always require the con-
clusion that a statute does not apply extraterritorially.  When a court uses the
presumption to interpret a statute, it will conclude that the statute does not
apply extraterritorially in the absence of sufficient evidence that the statute
was meant to apply extraterritorially.  In other words, the presumption can
be rebutted through evidence of a congressional intent to extend the statute
beyond the nation’s borders.  If Congress has reasons for extending the stat-
ute’s coverage beyond our borders and determines that those reasons out-
weigh the potential foreign policy problems that might result from
52 See W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., Int’l, 493 U.S. 400, 406–09
(1990) (“Act of state issues only arise when a court must decide—that is, when the outcome
of the case turns upon—the effect of official action by a foreign sovereign. . . . The act of
state doctrine . . . requires that, in the process of deciding [a case], the acts of foreign
sovereigns taken within their own jurisdictions shall be deemed valid.”).  The act of state
doctrine was held to be inapplicable in McKesson Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 672 F.3d
1066, 1075 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
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extraterritorial application of the statute, the courts will give effect to the
congressional intent.
The Court’s 1991 decision in Aramco appeared to treat the presumption
as a super-strong clear statement rule.  The Court seemed to insist on very
clear indication of extraterritorial applicability in the text of the statute.53  A
clear statement rule sometimes operates to frustrate rather than to ascertain
Congress’s intent, but such an approach might be defensible as a mechanism
for ensuring that Congress deliberates on the foreign policy considerations
that underlie the presumption.  In any event, the Court in later cases
retreated from Aramco’s treatment of the presumption as a clear statement
rule.54  In Morrison, the Court denied that the presumption operates as a
clear statement rule, recognizing that “context can be consulted as well,”
albeit as a “source[ ] of statutory meaning” that helps to give “‘the most faith-
ful reading of the text.’”55
Because the presumption has traditionally been framed as a technique
to interpret statutes, determining whether the presumption has been rebut-
ted poses particular challenges when it is being applied, as it was in Kiobel, to
determine the geographical scope of a federal common law rule.  A presump-
tion grounded in the assumption that Congress ordinarily is concerned only
with domestic matters would appear to be inapplicable to determining the
geographic scope of a rule created by the courts rather than by Congress.
The presumption also seems inapposite to the extent that it seeks to
“preserv[e] a stable background against which Congress can legislate with
predictable effects.”56
Indeed, the Court’s discussion of this issue in Morrison might have led it
to find the presumption inapplicable in Kiobel.  The concurring Justices in
Morrison argued that it was anomalous to apply the presumption against
extraterritoriality to causes of action under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, since the
cause of action was created by the courts as a matter of federal common law,
not by Congress.57  The Court responded to this argument not by denying
the force of its logic but by disputing its premise.  The issue in Morrison, the
Court said, was not the scope of the remedy but the scope of the underlying
conduct-regulating rule:
53 EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 258 (1991); see id. at 261
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (characterizing the majority as having adopted a clear statement
rule); William S. Dodge, Understanding the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 16 BERKELEY
J. INT’L L. 85, 86 (1998) (“[Aramco] suggested that only a ‘clear statement’ in the language
of the statute itself would be sufficient to overcome the presumption.”); Larry Kramer,
Vestiges of Beale: Extraterritorial Application of American Law, 1991 SUP. CT. REV. 179, 184 (not-
ing that Aramco reflects “strong clear statement principles” and “establishes a strong prefer-
ence that can be overcome only by unequivocal language”).
54 See Dodge, supra note 53, at 97.
55 Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2883 (2010) (quoting id. at 2892
(Stevens, J., concurring)).
56 Id. at 2881.
57 Id. at 2890, 2892 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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It is doubtless true that, because the implied private cause of action under
§ 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 is a thing of our own creation, we have also defined
its contours.  But when it comes to “the scope of [the] conduct prohibited by
[Rule 10b-5 and] § 10(b), the text of the statute controls our decision.”58
Thus, the Court did not disagree with the assertion that the presumption has
no role to play in determining the geographic scope of a judicially created
remedy, but it concluded that the issue before it was the geographic scope of
the “conduct prohibited by [Rule 10b-5 and] § 10(b).”59  Because the federal
common law cause of action recognized in Sosa is “a thing of [the courts’]
own creation,” it would seem to follow from Morrison’s reasoning that the
Court can itself “define[ ] its contours” without regard to the presumption
against extraterritoriality.60  Nevertheless, without addressing the point, the
Court in Kiobel declined to go down that road.
So how does one rebut the presumption against extraterritoriality when
the question is the extraterritorial scope of a rule of federal common law?  If
one applied a clear statement rule of the sort the Court seemed to endorse in
Aramco, one would presumably conclude that the presumption can virtually
never be rebutted.  There will rarely be explicit statutory language about the
geographical scope of a legal rule if the rule was created by the courts rather
than the legislature.  The one exception that comes to mind is where Con-
gress instructs the courts to formulate federal common law on a given topic,
as the Court held that Congress had done when it enacted the Taft-Hartley
Act.61  The ATS can hardly be described as an express instruction to the
courts to develop a federal common law cause of action for violations of cus-
tomary international law (as discussed below, the Court’s rationale for recog-
nizing such a cause of action in Sosa was very different), yet the Court in
Kiobel repeatedly referred to the possibility of “rebutting” or “overcoming”
the presumption.62
As noted, the Court in Morrison retreated from the Aramco “clear state-
ment” approach to the presumption, stating that “[a]ssuredly context can be
consulted as well [as text].”63  The Court in Morrison contemplated that con-
text would be taken into account insofar as it helps identify “ ‘the most faith-
ful reading’ of the text,”64 a use of context that would be difficult to
implement with respect to a judicially created cause of action.  But, in Kiobel,
the majority took context into account in a different way.  Quoting the “con-
text” language from Morrison, the Court asked whether the ATS’s “historical
58 Id. at 2881 n.5 (majority opinion) (alterations in original) (citation omitted) (quot-
ing Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 173
(1994)).
59 Id. (alteration in original).
60 Id.
61 See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 456 (1957).
62 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1665–66, 1669 (2013).
63 Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2883.
64 Id. (quoting id. at 2892 (Stevens, J., concurring)).
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background . . . overc[a]me” the presumption against extraterritoriality.65  It
discussed the historical incidents that very likely prompted the enactment of
the ATS, asking whether those incidents revealed a congressional concern
over disputes based on conduct that took place abroad.  “Two notorious epi-
sodes involving violations of the law of nations . . . shortly before passage of
the ATS” occurred within U.S. territory and thus, in the Court’s view, did not
suggest a congressional intent to cover foreign conduct.66  The third type of
violation of customary international law that was very likely on Congress’s
mind was piracy, which the majority distinguished because it generally takes
place on the high seas rather than in the territory of a foreign state.  Justice
Breyer persuasively responded that piracy typically occurs on a foreign ship,
which is considered to be within the jurisdiction of the flag state67—a point
to which the majority did not respond.  The Court cited Morrison’s statement
that “ ‘when a statute provides for some extraterritorial application, the pre-
sumption against extraterritoriality operates to limit that provision to its
terms,’”68 and apparently extended that interpretive principle to inferences
from the statute’s historical background, leading it to conclude (apparently)
that the cause of action under the ATS extends to conduct on the high seas
but not on foreign territory.69
The Court also took into account an opinion of Attorney General Brad-
ford from 1795, apparently as evidence of what the First Congress meant
when it enacted the ATS.70  The Court noted the respondents’ argument
that the Bradford opinion was distinguishable because it involved violations
of a treaty and “the applicable treaty had extraterritorial reach.”71  The fact
that the treaty had extraterritorial reach, however, does not distinguish it
from the substantive rules of customary international law that were the basis
of such cases as Filartiga and Kiobel, which also have universal reach.  Notably,
the Court’s dismissal of the Bradford opinion did not rely on the fact that the
treaty had extraterritorial reach.  The Court instead found the Bradford
opinion to be insufficient to “counter the weighty concerns underlying the
presumption against extraterritoriality” because the opinion “deals with U.S.
citizens who, by participating in an attack taking place both on the high seas
and on a foreign shore, violated a treaty between the United States and Great
65 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1666.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 1672 (Breyer, J., concurring).
68 Id. at 1667 (majority opinion) (quoting Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2883).
69 Other language in the opinion, however, suggests that the existence of a cause of
action for violations of customary international law occurring on the high seas may be
limited to piracy. See id. at 1667 (stating that “pirates may well be a category unto
themselves”).
70 Id. at 1668 (noting petitioners’ argument that the Bradford opinion “confirm[s]
that ‘the Founding generation understood the ATS to apply to law of nations violations
committed on the territory of a foreign sovereign’” (quoting Petitioners’ Supplemental
Opening Brief at 33, Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (No. 10-1491))).
71 Id.
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Britain.”72  The Court thus seems to have found the presumption to have
been overcome with respect to causes of action against U.S. citizens for viola-
tions of treaties.
The Court’s analysis in Kiobel shows that the presumption can be rebut-
ted (at least with respect to federal common law rules) through analysis of
context, including the historical background that led the Congress to enact a
related statute.  But the conclusions the Court drew from the ATS’s context
seem difficult to square with the Court’s analysis in Sosa, to which the Court
in Kiobel purported to be faithful.  As discussed in Part I, the Court in Kiobel
recognized the inapplicability of the presumption to the ATS qua jurisdic-
tional statute and applied the presumption against extraterritoriality instead
to determine the geographical scope of the federal common law cause of
action recognized in Sosa.  The Sosa Court regarded the federal common law
cause of action as a translation into post-Erie categories of the pre-Erie
assumption that a cause of action existed under the general law as it was
understood at the time of the ATS’s enactment.  Searching for a congres-
sional intent to extend the law extraterritorially seems inconsistent with the
Sosa Court’s reasons for recognizing a federal common law cause of action, as
that decision was based on conclusions about the Founding generation’s
understanding about the “ambient law of the era.”73  The general common
law was understood by the Founding generation to be universal in its applica-
tion.74 Sosa’s rationale for recognizing a federal common law cause of action
thus supports the conclusion that the cause of action is not territorially
limited.
Indeed, the majority opinion in Sosa appears to assume that the federal
common law cause of action it recognized extended to extraterritorial cases
such as Filartiga.  In recognizing the need for caution in recognizing a cause
of action for newly developed norms of customary international law, the
Court said:
It is one thing for American courts to enforce constitutional limits on our
own State and Federal Governments’ power, but quite another to consider
suits under rules that would go so far as to claim a limit on the power of foreign
governments over their own citizens, and to hold that a foreign government or its
agent has transgressed those limits.75
The Court obviously had Filartiga-style extraterritorial cases in mind and
urged caution because such cases pose potential foreign relations problems.
But the Court in Sosa plainly contemplated that a cause of action would exist
for some such claims.  The Court in Kiobel relied on the very same concerns
to conclude that the statute is not extraterritorial in its scope.
In sum, rebutting the presumption against extraterritoriality usually
requires evidence of a congressional intent to extend a statute to foreign
72 Id.
73 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 714.
74 See Anthony J. Bellia Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, General Law in Federal Court, 54 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 655, 666 (2013) (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *67).
75 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 727 (emphasis added).
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lands.  Such congressional intent will usually be absent when the question is
the extraterritorial reach of a judicially created cause of action.  The Court in
Kiobel entertained the possibility that the ATS’s context, including its histori-
cal background, might reveal a legislative intent that the cause of action
apply extraterritorially by suggesting that Congress had foreign disputes in
mind when it passed the law.  Drawing inferences from context regarding
Congress’s intent in enacting the ATS is difficult because Congress did not
intend to create a cause of action; it intended instead  to permit some preex-
isting causes of action to be brought in federal rather than state court.  Con-
gress assumed that the cause of action for breaches of certain norms of
international law was provided by the general common law.  Seeking to trans-
late the Framers’ assumption into post-Erie terms, the Court in Sosa con-
cluded that causes of action for breaches of analogous norms of customary
international law could be recognized today as federal common law causes of
action.  A modern court seeking to draw inferences about Congress’s under-
standing of the geographical scope of the causes of action that would be
brought in federal court under the ATS would presumably conclude that the
cause of action was not understood to be geographically limited, as both the
law of nations (the source of the defendant’s obligation) and the general
common law (the source of the plaintiff’s cause of action) were both under-
stood to be universal.
A statute’s “historical background” might alternatively help us under-
stand the appropriate geographical scope of a related federal common law
rule by revealing Congress’s purposes in enacting the statute.  A “purposive”
approach to the rebutting or overcoming of the presumption is in tension
with the approach to statutory interpretation that at least some of the Justices
in the majority in Kiobel—including importantly the author of Morrison—
favor.76  But it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the Court in Kiobel
effectively adopted such an approach when it considered whether the stat-
ute’s “historical background” overcame the presumption.  The Court looked
at the incidents that may have led to the enactment of the ATS to determine
whether Congress had foreign disputes in mind when it enacted the ATS.  To
ask what sorts of disputes Congress had in mind in enacting the statute is an
indirect way to ask what Congress’s purposes were in enacting the statute.77
There is little direct evidence of Congress’s purpose in enacting the ATS.
Congress’s purposes must be inferred from the statute’s text and the contem-
poraneous incidents that the Court considered in Kiobel.  At a broad level,
Congress surely meant to protect the federal interest in avoiding foreign rela-
76 See generally ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION (1997) (discussing Jus-
tice Scalia’s approach to legal interpretation).
77 By recognizing that the presumption may be rebutted by inferences from Con-
gress’s purposes in enacting the statute, as reflected in the statute’s historical background,
the Court blurred the distinction between the question of the presumption’s applicability
(the focus of Part I) and the question whether the presumption has been rebutted or
overcome.  The distinction is clearer to the extent the rebutting of the presumption is
based on evidence that Congress specifically intended the statute to apply extraterritorially.
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tions problems by giving jurisdiction to federal courts, which were assumed
to be more likely than state courts to resolve the dispute in accordance with
the law and with appropriate sensitivity to those federal interests.  But this
broad interest underlay a number of grants of jurisdiction.  Congress must
have had a more specific purpose in conferring jurisdiction on the federal
courts in suits by an alien for a tort in violation of the law of nations.
The majority in Kiobel inferred from the “two notorious episodes” that
preceded the statute’s enactment, as well as the two cases in which the ATS
was invoked shortly after its passage, that the statute was designed to address
the “embarrass[ment]” caused by the United States’ “potential inability to
provide judicial relief to foreign officials injured in the United States.”78
“Such offenses against ambassadors violated the law of nations, ‘and if not
adequately redressed could rise to an issue of war.’”79  That Congress’s only
concern was to redress injuries caused on U.S. territory is difficult to square
with the fact, acknowledged by the Court, that Congress also had piracy in
mind in enacting the ATS.  But even the Court’s analysis of Congress’s rea-
sons for being concerned about assaults on ambassadors fails to support its
conclusion that Congress was only interested in such assaults if they occurred
on U.S. territory.  The Court in Kiobel noted that Congress wished to provide
redress when failure to provide it would “rise to an issue of war.”80  Failure to
provide redress would have had that effect not only when it occurred on U.S.
territory, but also when caused by U.S. citizens outside U.S. territory.81  Inter-
national law principles of attribution today would similarly hold the United
States responsible for an unremedied injury not only if it occurred on U.S.
territory, but also if it was caused by a U.S. citizen acting outside the United
States.82  Indeed, the United States would be responsible under international
law for an unremedied injury caused by a foreigner abroad if the injury was
caused at the behest of U.S. officials.83  This was the situation in Sosa, where
the injury was caused by a Mexican citizen on Mexican soil at the behest of
U.S. officials.84  The Court’s own search for Congress’s purpose in enacting
the ATS, as reflected in the statute’s “historical background,” should thus
have led the Court to conclude that the presumption was overcome with
respect to this further category of claim.
In sum, the Court should have concluded—based on its own assessment
of Congress’s purpose of avoiding embarrassment and possible war resulting
from the failure to remedy injuries that would otherwise be attributed to the
United States—that the Sosa cause of action extends to some disputes not
based on domestic conduct.  Reading the ATS in light of this purpose would
have yielded the conclusion that the cause of action extends to injuries
78 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1666, 1668 (majority opinion).
79 Id. at 1668 (quoting Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 715 (2004)).
80 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
81 See Vázquez, supra note 21, at 539.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 698.
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caused by foreign conduct if the injury produced a violation of international
law and was perpetrated by U.S. citizens or at the behest of U.S. officials, as
well as when the injuries occurred on U.S. territory.  A purposive approach
should have led the Court to find the presumption against extraterritoriality
to have been rebutted or overcome with respect to violations of the law of
nations perpetrated by or at the behest of U.S. nationals, just as the majority
concluded that the presumption was overcome with respect to treaty viola-
tions by U.S. nationals.  So read, the statute would have been broader than
the majority suggested but narrower than Justice Breyer would have read it.  I
argue in Part IV that Kiobel leaves open this possibility.
III. SATISFYING THE PRESUMPTION
When the presumption against extraterritoriality is applicable and not
rebutted or overcome, courts read the statute not to apply “extraterritorially.”
As the Court put it (not entirely accurately) in Morrison, “[w]hen a statute
gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none.”85
Determining whether a statute, so construed, reaches a particular transaction
or occurrence will not always be straightforward.  There will of course be some
easy cases.  If all of the relevant connections are with the United States, the
statute applies; if all of the relevant connections are with other nations, the
statute does not apply.  But, in an increasingly interconnected world, there
will frequently be cases with connections both to the United States and to
other countries (or other places outside the United States).  Determining
whether the statute, read in light of the presumption against extraterritorial-
ity, applies to the particular case may be understood as an inquiry into
whether the requirements of the presumption are satisfied in the particular
case.86
In determining whether a statute, read in light of the presumption
against extraterritoriality, reaches a particular case, the first question that
arises concerns the sorts of connections to the United States that are rele-
vant.  One possibility is that the presumption is satisfied if the effects of the
conduct are felt in the United States, or if the conduct was intended to pro-
duce effects on U.S. territory.  Some scholars have argued that the presump-
tion, properly understood, should permit the application of statutes to
conduct that has effects in the United States.87  Another possibility is that the
85 Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2873 (2010).  The statement is
inaccurate insofar as the Court recognized that a non-extraterritorial statute can apply to
cases based in part on foreign conduct, such as cases alleging foreign fraud in connection
with the sale of a security on a U.S. exchange. See infra text accompanying notes 93–100.
86 Strictly speaking, it is an inquiry into whether the conditions for the statute’s appli-
cability are satisfied.  But, since these conditions are dictated by the presumption against
extraterritoriality, we might fairly say that a court is determining whether the requirements
of the presumption are satisfied.
87 See, e.g., Dodge, supra note 53, at 90 (“[U]nder the presumption, acts of Congress
should presumptively apply only to conduct that causes effects within the United States
regardless of where that conduct occurs.”).
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statute applies if the defendant or plaintiff (or both) are nationals of the
United States.  With respect to the ATS, Justice Breyer favored the latter
approach.88
Other scholars have argued persuasively that only the location of the
conduct, as distinguished from that of the conduct’s effects or the nationality
of the parties, is relevant:
As traditionally used by judges and commentators, . . . “territoriality”
referred to acts occurring within the nation and was meant to exclude asser-
tions of authority based on nationality or effects. . . . The presumption
against extraterritoriality, in other words, refers to a presumption that laws
regulate only acts occurring within the United States.89
Indeed, it is the presumption’s exclusive focus on the place of the relevant
conduct that distinguishes it from other techniques for determining the geo-
graphic scope of statutes.
That the Court in Kiobel understood the presumption to focus on the
place of the conduct underlying the claim is supported by the majority’s con-
sistent references to the place of conduct as the focus of the presumption.90
Justice Breyer certainly read the majority to understand the presumption as
barring application of the statute on the basis of the nationality of the defen-
dant.  Justice Breyer would have recognized a cause of action where the
defendant was a U.S. national;91 his understanding that the majority’s rea-
soning disallowed that conclusion was one of the reasons he declined to join
that opinion.92
Narrowing the focus to the location of the conduct underlying the claim
makes it possible to dispose of many cases.  Thus, where all of the conduct
underlying the claim occurred in the United States, the statute applies, even
if all of the parties are foreign and even if all of the effects were felt abroad.
Conversely, where all of the conduct underlying the claim occurred outside
the United States (whether in other countries or on the high seas), the stat-
ute does not apply, even if all of the parties are U.S. nationals and all of the
effects were felt (and were intended to be felt) in the United States.
More difficult are the cases in which some of the conduct underlying the
claim took place in the United States and some took place outside the United
States.  The majority did not address this question.  The Court in Morrison
addressed whether the fact that some relevant conduct took place on U.S.
territory sufficed to satisfy the presumption, and it concluded that it did
not.93  It reasoned that “the presumption against extraterritorial application
would be a craven watchdog indeed if it retreated to its kennel whenever some
88 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1671 (2013) (Breyer, J.,
concurring).
89 Kramer, supra note 53, at 181.
90 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1662, 1664–69 (majority opinion).
91 Id. at 1671 (Breyer, J., concurring).
92 Id.
93 Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2884 (2010).
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domestic activity is involved in the case.”94  The Court held instead that the
presumption is satisfied when the conduct that “was the ‘focus’ of congres-
sional concern,”95 or the conduct “that the statute seeks to ‘regulate’”96 or to
“‘protec[t]’”97 took place on U.S. territory.  The statute before the Court in
Morrison punished deceptive conduct “‘in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security.’”98  According to the Court, it was the purchase and sale
of the securities that was the “object[ ] of the statute’s solicitude”—the trans-
action that the statute sought to “regulate” and “protect.”99  Thus, the Court
concluded, it was the purchase or sale of the security that had to have
occurred in the United States; that some of the deceptive conduct took place
in the United States does not warrant application of the statute.100
The Court’s holding in Morrison that the purchase or sale of the security
and not the deceptive conduct was Congress’s “focus” is not self-evident.  It is
of course true, as the Court noted, that “[s]ection 10(b) does not punish
deceptive conduct, but only deceptive conduct ‘in connection with the
purchase or sale of [certain specified] securities.’”101  This does mean that
deceptive conduct not in connection with purchases or sales of securities is
not prohibited.  But it is equally true that sales or purchases of securities
without deceptive conduct are not prohibited.  It would seem that the decep-
tive conduct and the purchase or sale of the security were both foci of con-
gressional concern.  Indeed, if the presumption against extraterritoriality
focuses on the location of the relevant conduct rather than its effects, it
would seem to make more sense to focus on the conduct prohibited by the
statute (in this case, the deceptive practices) rather than the object of the
prohibited conduct (in this case the sale or purchase of the security), as the
latter seems more akin to the effect of the conduct rather than the conduct
itself.  The Court’s focus on the sale or purchase does seem consistent with
the traditional lex loci delicti test, under which the law applicable to a claim
was that of the place of the last event necessary to give rise to liability.102
Since deceptive practices without a subsequent sale or purchase do not give
rise to liability, the “last event” necessary to give rise to liability would be the
sale or purchase.  Although the Court in Morrison did not cite the much-
maligned first Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws, its holding lends
credence to Larry Kramer’s claim that the Court’s new emphasis on the pre-
94 Id.
95 Id. (quoting EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 255 (1991)).
96 Id. (quoting Superintendent of Ins. of N.Y. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12
(1971)).
97 Id. (quoting Superintendent of Ins., 404 U.S. at 10).
98 Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006)).
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)).
102 See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 377 (1934) (“The place of
wrong is in the state where the last event necessary to make an actor liable for an alleged
tort takes place.”).
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sumption against extraterritoriality is a throwback to the days when Professor
Beale’s theories prevailed.103
Be that as it may, Justice Alito’s discussion of what it would take to satisfy
the presumption for causes of action under the ATS would strengthen the
presumption to an extent that seems incompatible with Morrison’s reasoning
or result.  Justice Alito quoted Morrison’s “craven watchdog” language and
purported to apply its analysis, under which the presumption is satisfied
“only if the event or relationship that was ‘the “focus” of congressional con-
cern’ under the relevant statute takes place within the United States.”104  He
then cited Sosa as having concluded that Congress’s concern when it enacted
the ATS was “focus[ed]” on “the ‘three principal offenses against the law of
nations’ that had been identified by Blackstone: violation of safe conducts,
infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy.”105  Because the Court
in Sosa held that a cause of action should not be recognized “‘for violations
of any international law norm with less definite content and acceptance
among civilized nations than [these] historical paradigms,’” Justice Alito con-
cluded that the presumption would not be satisfied unless all of the conduct
sufficient to meet the Sosa test took place in the United States.106
Justice Alito’s conclusion does not follow from the Morrison analysis.
Morrison denied that all of the relevant conduct had to have taken place in
the United States, lest the presumption be transformed into a “craven watch-
dog.”107  It concluded that the presumption would be satisfied if particular
acts took place in the United States, even if some acts essential to the claim
took place abroad.108  Justice Alito, on the other hand, understands “the
‘focus’ of congressional concern” to encompass all of the acts necessary to
make out a claim.109  This was not the rule even under Professor Beale’s
approach.110  If every state adopted Justice Alito’s approach, injuries caused
by conduct spanning more than one country would never be covered by any
nation’s law.  Justice Alito goes well beyond what is necessary to prevent the
presumption from becoming a “craven watchdog.”  Indeed, under Justice
Alito’s approach, it would be the statute that Congress passed that would
warrant that epithet.  The fact that only Justice Thomas joined Justice Alito’s
concurrence suggests that a majority of the Court would not go that far.
103 See generally Kramer, supra note 53 (arguing that the Supreme Court revived an
anachronism by adopting the presumption against extraterritoriality).
104 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1670 (2013) (Alito, J., concur-
ring) (quoting EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 255 (1991)).
105 Id. (quoting Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 723–24 (2004)).
106 Id. (quoting Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732).
107 Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2884 (2010).
108 Id.
109 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1670 (Alito, J., concurring).
110 Under Professor Beale’s approach, as reflected in the original Restatement of Conflict
of Laws, the applicable law in tort cases was that of the state where the injury occurred, even
if all of the conduct leading up to that injury occurred in another state. See RESTATEMENT
OF THE LAW OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 377 (1934).  For a vivid example of this approach, see
Ala. G.S.R. Co. v. Carroll, 11 So. 803 (Ala. 1892).
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If one recognizes that the cause of action extends to claims based on
conduct that occurred partly in the United States and partly elsewhere, the
courts will have to work out what conduct exactly has to have occurred in the
United States, and Morrison tells them that they are to do so by determining
the particular “focus of congressional concern.”  As the foregoing discussion
of Morrison suggests, doing so is no easy task.  It is particularly difficult when,
as with the ATS, Congress did not purport to be regulating primary conduct
at all.  One way to approach the identification of the “focus of [Congress’s]
concern” when it passed a statute would be to ask what Congress’s purpose
was in enacting the statute. But, as shown by our discussion in Part II, Con-
gress’s purposes in enacting the ATS should have led the Court to conclude
that the cause of action extends to some violations of the law of nations
occurring entirely abroad, such as those perpetrated by U.S. nationals or at
the behest of U.S. officials.  The Court’s conclusion that the presumption was
not rebutted would appear to rule out the conclusion that the statute extends
to such cases.  One way out of this difficulty would be to recognize that the
presumption can be satisfied through connections to the United States other
than the location of the conduct on which the suit is based.  But such an
approach would be a departure from the Court’s usual approach to the pre-
sumption and seems to deprive the presumption of its distinctiveness as an
approach to determining the geographical scope of federal statutes.  The
Court’s reference to the possibility of “displacing” the presumption may offer
an escape from this conundrum.
IV. DISPLACING THE PRESUMPTION
In the passage of its opinion that has generated the most commentary
among scholars trying to ascertain what the Court decided and what it left
open, the Court referred to the possibility of “displacing” the presumption
against extraterritoriality.  The Court wrote that, “even where the claims
touch and concern the territory of the United States, they must do so with
sufficient force to displace the presumption against extraterritorial applica-
tion.”111  What the Court meant by “displacing” the presumption is far from
clear.
In the past, the Court has used the term “displace” in a variety of ways in
describing what might be done with a presumption.  Perhaps the clearest
sense in which a presumption might be “displaced” is when the Court
decides that statutes should no longer be interpreted through application of
the presumption in question.  Thus, in Landgraf, the Court wrote that “[t]he
authorities we relied upon in Bradley lend further support to the conclusion
that we did not intend to displace the traditional presumption against apply-
ing statutes affecting substantive rights, liabilities, or duties to conduct arising
before their enactment.”112  Analogously, one might say that the presump-
tion against extraterritoriality would be displaced if the Court decided that
111 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669 (majority opinion).
112 Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 278 (1994).
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the geographical scope of federal statutes should henceforth be decided
through application of a presumption in favor of extraterritoriality.  More
realistically, the Court might displace the presumption against extraterritori-
ality with an approach requiring that the geographical scope of federal stat-
utes be decided by means of ordinary principles of interpretation, or by
means of a “presumption against extrajurisdictionality.”113  The Court would
have “displaced” the presumption against extraterritoriality, in this sense of
that term, if it had rejected the presumption wholesale.  Although the Court
in Kiobel did not reject the presumption wholesale, its use of the term “dis-
place” suggests that it left open the possibility that the presumption might be
inapplicable or overcome with respect to particular types of claims.
Justices Alito and Thomas understood the majority’s reference to “dis-
placement” of the presumption to be addressed to the question whether the
presumption has been satisfied in the particular case.114  Justice Alito framed
his concurrence as an elaboration of the “touch and concern” passage in the
majority opinion, the passage that has been widely understood to describe
the limitations of the majority’s holding in the case.115  As discussed in Part
III above, Justice Alito’s concurrence addressed how much of the conduct
has to have taken place in the United States for a federal common law cause
of action to exist in light of the presumption against extraterritoriality,116
and he concluded, improbably, that all of the conduct necessary to make out
a violation of a cognizable norm of international law must have taken place
on U.S. soil (a position that seven Justices declined to endorse).117  Clearly,
therefore, Justice Alito and Thomas take the view that the only issue left open
by the majority is the quantity of conduct in the United States necessary to
satisfy the presumption in the context of the ATS.
Some aspects of the majority opinion support that interpretation.  Per-
haps most revealingly, following the “touch and concern” language, the
majority opinion cited the pages of the Morrison opinion discussed in Part III,
above, addressing how a court is to determine what conduct must take place
in the United States in order to satisfy the presumption against extraterritori-
ality.118  Additionally, the majority referred to claims touching and concern-
ing “the territory of the United States,” thus suggesting that connections to the
United States unrelated to territory are not relevant.119  Indeed, the term
“touch and concern” itself suggests a territorial focus, as it is a term of art in
113 See John H. Knox, A Presumption Against Extrajurisdictionality, 104 AM. J. INT’L L. 351,
351 (2010).
114 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1670 (Alito, J., concurring); see supra Part III.
115 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1670.
116 See supra notes 104–10 and accompanying text.
117 See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
118 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669 (majority opinion).
119 Id. (emphasis added).
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the law of real property, referring to a requirement for a covenant that “runs
with the land.”120
Cutting against this interpretation, however, is the Court’s use of the
term “displace.”  That term seems inapt to describe the issue we have been
calling the “satisfying” of the presumption.  Indeed, displacing a presump-
tion seems like the opposite of satisfying it.  There are admittedly a number
of cases indicating that a presumption can be “displaced” in a particular case
through the introduction of sufficient evidence of the relevant kind.  For
example, in Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, the Court
wrote that, to make out a selective prosecution claim, “a criminal defendant
[must] introduce ‘clear evidence’ displacing the presumption that a prosecu-
tor has acted lawfully.”121  This case-specific approach to displacement might
be thought analogous to the case-specific analysis the courts employ to deter-
mine whether the presumption has been satisfied.  But the cases that use the
term “displace” to refer to the amount of evidence that must be submitted in
a particular case involve evidentiary presumptions, not interpretive presump-
tions.  When the law presumes certain facts to be true, it requires the intro-
duction of sufficient evidence to establish the contrary.  Because what is
being presumed is a fact that the litigants must prove in a case, it makes sense
to say that a litigant displaces the presumption in a particular case by intro-
ducing sufficient evidence to the contrary.
An interpretive presumption is addressed to the legislature, not to the
litigants.  An interpretive presumption assumes that a statute means one
thing unless the legislature supplies sufficient indication of its intent to enact
the contrary.  Thus, with respect to an interpretive presumption, the analo-
gous use of the term “displace” would be to refer to the quantum of evidence
of Congress’s intent necessary to support the disfavored interpretation.
Indeed, individual justices, and lower courts more frequently, have used the
term “displace,” with respect to an interpretive presumption, to refer to
exactly that question.122  This is, of course, one aspect of what we referred to
120 STEVEN H. GIFIS, BARRON’S LAW DICTIONARY 494 (3d ed. 1991) (“[I]n real property
law, a requirement for a covenant which ‘runs with the land’ is that it touch and concern
the land involved.”).
121 Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 489 (1999) (citation
omitted); see Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 771 (2006) (“[A] State . . . must be able to
deny a defendant the opportunity to displace the presumption of sanity more easily when
addressing a different issue in the course of the criminal trial.”); Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S.
393, 568 (1856) (“When, therefore, as in this case, the necessary averments as to citizen-
ship are made on the record, and jurisdiction is assumed to exist, and the defendant comes
by a plea to the jurisdiction to displace that presumption, he occupies, in my judgment,
precisely the position described in [cited case].”).
122 See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 86 (1996) (Stevens, J., dis-
senting) (“Hans itself looked to see whether Congress had displaced the presumption that
sovereign immunity obtains.”); Bonjorno v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 865 F.2d
566, 575 (3d Cir. 1989) (“[W]e find that the legislative history of the FCIA does not dis-
place the Bradley presumption.”); Blackhawk Heating & Plumbing Co. v. United States, 622
F.2d 539, 552 (Ct. Cl. 1980) (per curiam) (“The [statutory] language, being so plainly all
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above as the rebutting or overcoming of the presumption.  I have not been
able to find any examples of a court referring to the question whether the
requirements of an interpretive presumption are satisfied as the “displacing”
of the presumption.  The plain meaning of the term “displace,” and the
courts’ use of the term in the past in reference to presumptions, describe the
conclusion that the presumption is rebutted or overcome, not that it is satisfied.
The Court may also have been using the term “displace” to refer to the
possibility that the presumption is inapplicable to or overcome with respect
to certain claims brought under the ATS.123  Support for the latter interpre-
tation of “displace” can be found in Justice Kennedy’s brief concurring opin-
ion.  That opinion begins by noting that the majority was “careful to leave
open a number of significant questions regarding the reach and interpreta-
tion of the Alien Tort Statute.”124  Since virtually all of the ATS cases brought
before Kiobel were based on violations of international law that took place
entirely abroad, the question of the amount of conduct that must take place
in the United States for the claim to be actionable would not appear to be a
“significant” one.  Moreover, that is just one question; Justice Kennedy wrote
that the majority had left open a number of questions about the cause of
action’s reach.125  If so, then the Court left open some questions in addition
to the amount and type of conduct that has to take place in the United States
for the claim to be actionable.
Justice Kennedy then noted that “[m]any serious concerns with respect
to human rights abuses committed abroad have been addressed by Congress
in statutes such as the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 (TVPA), and
that class of cases will be determined in the future according to the detailed
statutory scheme Congress has enacted.”126  This sentence may be read to
support the conclusion that Congress did not leave open the possibility that
the presumption against extraterritoriality might be inapplicable to certain
sorts of ATS cases.  If the phrase “that class of cases” refers to “human rights
abuses committed abroad,” then Justice Kennedy might have been saying
here that, if the violation was committed entirely abroad, only specifically
extraterritorial statutes such as the TVPA govern.  But Justice Kennedy might
have been referring instead to the class of cases “addressed by Congress in
statutes such as the Torture Victim Protection Act.”127  If so, the sentence
would neither support nor detract from the view that the Court left open the
inclusive, must displace that general presumption which accords to Congress an intent that
statutes are to have a prospective application only.”).
123 As noted above, see supra note 77, the Court in Kiobel blurred the distinction
between the applicability of the presumption to a particular category of statute and the
rebutting or overcoming of the presumption with respect to a given statute when it recog-
nized the possibility of rebutting the presumption by reference to the statute’s purposes as
reflected in its historical background.
124 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
125 Id.
126 Id. (citation omitted).
127 Id.
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possibility that the presumption against extraterritoriality might be inapplica-
ble to some ATS cases.
Most importantly, Justice Kennedy next wrote that “[o]ther cases may
arise with allegations of serious violations of international law principles pro-
tecting persons, cases covered neither by the TVPA nor by the reasoning and
holding of today’s case.”128  A case involving serious violations of interna-
tional law would not be covered by the TVPA if the international norm that
was violated was not among those for the violation of which the TVPA creates
a cause of action,129 or if the violation was perpetrated by an individual not
acting “under [the] actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any for-
eign nation.”130  (On the other hand, a case is not “not covered” by the
TVPA because the violation occurred on U.S. territory.)131  Justice Kennedy
is saying here that there may be serious violations involving norms other than
those relating to torture and extrajudicial killing, or involving violations per-
petrated under the actual or apparent authority of the United States, that are
not covered by the majority’s reasoning or holding.  The strong implication
is that these cases would not be subject to the Court’s holding that the pre-
sumption against extraterritoriality limits the reach of the Sosa cause of
action.
On the other hand, Justice Kennedy completed the sentence by noting
that “in those disputes the proper implementation of the presumption
against extraterritorial application may require some further elaboration and
explanation.”132  His reference to the “implementation” of the presumption
against extraterritoriality in such cases may suggest that he was not saying
that the presumption might be inapplicable to some such cases.  But Justice
Kennedy might have meant instead that a finding that the presumption is
inapplicable to a particular type of “serious violation” of an international law
norm is an “implementation” of the presumption.  One might plausibly view
a court’s inquiry into whether the presumption is inapplicable or overcome
as an “implementation” of the presumption.
As discussed in Part II, the majority in Kiobel recognized that the pre-
sumption might be overcome by context, including the statute’s historical
background.  As discussed above, the Court’s analysis in this respect is tanta-
mount to an inquiry into whether Congress’s purpose in enacting the statute
supports an inference of extraterritorial applicability.  As also noted above,
one of Congress’s purposes in enacting the ATS was to avoid foreign relations
problems that would be caused by breaches of international law that would
be attributable to the United States if left unremedied.  One circumstance in
which an unremedied breach would give rise to the responsibility of the
128 Id.
129 The TVPA applies only to torture or extrajudicial killing. See Torture Victim Protec-
tion Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, § 2(a), 106 Stat. 73 (1992) (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1350 note (2006)).
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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United States under international law is when the violation was perpetrated
(in the language of the TVPA) “with the actual or apparent authority of [the
United States],”133 even if the violation took place on foreign soil.134  This
purposive analysis would support the recognition of a cause of action for vio-
lations of norms of international law that meet the Sosa test even if they
occurred abroad if such violations would be attributable to the United States
when left unremedied.  In other words, this analysis would support the con-
clusion that the presumption against extraterritoriality should be deemed
“displaced” in this category of ATS cases.  Justice Kennedy might therefore
have considered that this type of case is not “covered” by the “holding” of
Kiobel insofar as the majority (implicitly) recognized the need to identify
Congress’s purpose, concluded that that Congress did not intend to “rule the
world,” and recognized that one of the purposes of the ATS was to avoid
embarrassment and war.
Justice Kennedy’s opinion might suggest that he might find the pre-
sumption against extraterritoriality to be displaced (that is, inapplicable or
overcome) in other sorts of cases as well.  Kennedy noted that the Court had
left open “a number” of “significant questions.”135  And, given the numerous
separate bars to recovery against U.S. officials who violate international
law,136 recognition of a cause of action for violations of international law
attributable to the United States may not even rise to the level of a “signifi-
cant” question (although Sosa itself shows that such cases do arise from time
to time).  The other types of ATS claims as to which Justice Kennedy might
regard the presumption against extraterritoriality to be displaced (in the
sense of being inapplicable or overcome) remain to be identified.
I have relied heavily on Justice Kennedy’s brief concurring opinion to
buttress my textual argument that the majority’s reference to the possible
“displacement” of the presumption against extraterritoriality with respect to
some ATS claims is a reference to the possible inapplicability of the presump-
tion to some such claims.  As discussed above, the majority opinion in some
respects supports a contrary interpretation of “displace.”  The other Justices
in the majority thus may or may not have understood the term to mean what
I have suggested here.  Even if those Justices were not using the term in its
straightforward sense, however, it is fair to interpret the term to reflect the
sorts of questions Justice Kennedy believed Kiobel left undecided.  Without
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, the Chief Justice’s opinion would have been
the opinion of a plurality rather than of a majority.  For this reason, whatever
questions Justice Kennedy indicated were left open were left open.  Justice
Kennedy did not himself use the term “displace” in discussing the issues
Kiobel leaves open.  But it seems clear that the otherwise mystifying final para-
graph of the majority opinion—the paragraph Justice Alito cites for the pro-
133 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note.
134 See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
135 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
136 See, e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 699–712 (2004) (discussing the for-
eign country exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act).
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position that the Court “leaves much unanswered”—was included to allay
Justice Kennedy’s concerns.  Because Justice Kennedy seems rather clearly to
have been contemplating the inapplicability of the presumption to some ATS
cases, the reference to the possible “displacement” of the presumption
should be understood, consistent with the plain meaning of the term and the
Courts’ prior use of it, to refer to the possible inapplicability of the presump-
tion with respect to ATS cases involving some categories of serious violations
of international law.
CONCLUSION
There are several things that one might do with a presumption such as
that against extraterritorial application of statutes.  As a threshold matter,
one might conclude that the presumption is inapplicable to certain types of
statutes because the concerns underlying the presumption would not be
advanced by applying the presumption to them.  Second, one might con-
clude that the presumption has been rebutted or overcome.  Usually, one
rebuts the presumption through evidence that Congress intended the statute
to apply extraterritorially.  In Kiobel, the Court recognized that context can
be taken into account in rebutting the presumption and that the presump-
tion might be overcome as well by the statute’s “historical background.”
Third, one might satisfy the presumption.  The presumption is satisfied (or,
to be more precise, the conditions for applying the statute, as construed pur-
suant to the presumption, are satisfied) if the relevant conduct took place in
the territory of the United States.  This Article discussed the Court’s treat-
ment of when the presumption does and does not apply and how one rebuts
and satisfies the presumption when it does apply and explored some ques-
tions raised by the Court’s analysis of these issues.
Kiobel refers to a fourth thing one might do with the presumption: dis-
place it.  Justice Alito seems to have understood the Court’s reference to the
possibility of displacing the presumption to be a reference to the question of
what it takes to satisfy the presumption.  There is some support for that view
in the majority opinion.  On the other hand, the plain meaning of the term
“displace,” and the courts’ prior use of the term to describe something one
might do with a presumption, suggests that the term refers to a way of rebut-
ting or overcoming the presumption or determining that it is inapplicable in
certain circumstances.  I draw support for the latter interpretation from Jus-
tice Kennedy’s concurring opinion, which indicates that some cases alleging
serious violations of international law may not be covered by the reasoning or
holding of the majority.  I suggest that one category of cases to which the
presumption should not be applied consists of cases in which the violation, if
unremedied, would give rise to the international responsibility of the United
States.  In some such cases, the violation will have occurred on U.S. soil, but
in other cases the violation might have been perpetrated by U.S. citizens, or
at the behest of U.S. officials, on foreign soil.
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